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Think again: The Geneva Conventions
Prior to joining the Law School in 2004, Professor Steven R. Ratner was the Albert Sidney Burleson
Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law at Austin. He holds a J.D. from Yale, an
M.A. (diplôme) from the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva), and an
A.B. from Princeton. Before joining the Texas faculty in 1993, he was an attorney-adviser in the
Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department.
Ratner’s research has focused on new challenges facing new governments and international institutions after the Cold War, including ethnic conflict, territorial borders, implementation of peace agreements, and accountability for human rights violations. He has written and spoken extensively on
the law of war, and is also interested in the intersection of international law and moral philosophy
and other theoretical issues. In 1998-1999, he served as a member of the UN Secretary-General’s
three-person Group of Experts for Cambodia, and has advised the United Nations on issues of
counter-terrorism, the human rights responsibilities of corporations, and the role of amnesties in
UN-mediated peace negotiations.
Among his publications are five books: The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of
Conflict After the Cold War (St. Martin’s, 1995); Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford, 1997 and 2001) (co-author); International
War Crimes Trials: Making a Difference? (University of Texas Law School, 2004) (co-editor); The
Methods of International Law (American Society of International Law, 2004) (co-editor); and
International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (Aspen, 2002 and 2006) (co-author). A member of the
board of editors of the American Journal of International Law, he was a Fulbright Scholar at The
Hague during 1998-99, where he worked in and studied the office of the OSCE (Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe) High Commissioner on National Minorities. He teaches a
variety of courses in international law and established and oversees the Law School’s externship
program with international organizations and NGOs in Geneva, Switzerland.
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James Boyd White is L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law Emeritus, Professor of English,
and Adjunct Professor of Classics at the University of Michigan. He has published many books and
articles on the nature of legal thought and expression, beginning with The Legal Imagination (Little,
Brown 1973). His most recent book is Living Speech: Resisting the Empire of Force (Princeton, 2006).
In this book he addresses some of the themes of the conference, as he also does in an interview
published in 105 Michigan Law Review 1403 (1907).
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Think again: The Geneva Conventions
By Steven R. Ratner
The following essay is based on the author’s article of the same name
in the “Think Again” section of the March/April 2008 issue of Foreign
Policy (pages 26-32). It is reproduced here with permission from
FOREIGN POLICY, www.ForeignPolicy.com, #165 (March/April 2008).
Copyright 2008 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The “Think Again” section of Foreign Policy seeks to educate readers
by presenting and responding to common myths and conventional
wisdom on important matters of international relations.

“The Geneva Conventions are obsolete”
Only in the minor details. The laws of armed conflict are old; they
date back millennia to warrior codes used in ancient Greece. But
the modern Geneva Conventions, which govern the treatment
of soldiers and civilians in war, can trace their direct origin to
1859, when Swiss businessman Henri Dunant happened upon
the bloody aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. His outrage at
the suffering of the wounded led him to establish what would
become the International Committee of the Red Cross, which
later lobbied for rules improving the treatment of injured
combatants. Decades later, when the devastation of World War
II demonstrated that broader protections were necessary, the
modern Geneva Conventions were created, producing a kind of
international “bill of rights” that governs the handling of casualties, prisoners of war (POWs), and civilians in war zones. Today,
the conventions have been ratified by every nation on the planet.
Of course, the drafters probably never imagined a conflict like
the war on terror or combatants like al Qaeda. The conventions
were always primarily concerned with wars between states. That
can leave some of the protections enshrined in the laws feeling a
little old-fashioned today. It seems slightly absurd to worry too
much about captured terrorists’ tobacco rations or the fate of a
prisoner’s horse, as the conventions do. So, when then-White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote President George W.
Bush in 2002 arguing that the “new paradigm” of armed conflict
rendered parts of the conventions “obsolete” and “quaint,” he had
a point. In very specific—and minor—details, the conventions
have been superseded by time and technology.
But the core provisions and, more crucially, the spirit of the
conventions remain enormously relevant for modern warfare.
For one, the world is still home to dozens of wars, for which the
conventions have important, unambiguous rules, such as forbidding pillaging and prohibiting the use of child soldiers. These
rules apply to both aggressor and defending nations, and, in civil
wars, to governments and insurgent groups.
The conventions won’t prevent wars—they were never
intended to—but they can and do protect innocent bystanders,
shield soldiers from unnecessary harm, limit the physical damage
caused by war, and even enhance the chances for cease-fires and
peace. The fundamental bedrock of the conventions is to prevent
suffering in war, and that gives them a legitimacy for anyone
touched by conflict, anywhere, and at any time. That is hardly
quaint or old-fashioned.

“If you’ve seen a classic war movie such as The Great
Escape, you know that prisoners of war are only obligated to
provide name, rank, date of birth, and military serial number
to their captors. But the Geneva Conventions do
not ban interrogators from asking for more.”
“The conventions don’t apply to al Qaeda”
Wrong. The Bush administration’s position since Sept. 11, 2001,
has been that the global war on terror is a different kind of war,
one in which the Geneva Conventions do not apply. It is true that
the laws do not specifically mention wars against nonstate actors
such as al Qaeda. But there have always been “irregular” forces
that participate in warfare, and the conflicts of the 20th century
were no exception. The French Resistance during World War II
operated without uniforms. Vietcong guerrillas fighting in South
Vietnam were not part of any formal army, but the United States
nonetheless treated those they captured as POWs.
So what treatment should al Qaeda get? The conventions
contain one section—Article 3—that protects all persons
regardless of their status, whether spy, mercenary, or terrorist,
and regardless of the type of war in which they are fighting. That
same article prohibits torture, cruel treatment, and murder of all
detainees, requires the wounded to be cared for, and says that any
trials must be conducted by regular courts respecting due process.
In a landmark 2006 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that at a minimum Article 3 applies to detained al Qaeda suspects.
In other words, the rules apply, even if al Qaeda ignores them.
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And it may be that even tougher rules should be used in
such a fight. Many other governments, particularly in Europe,
believe that a “war” against terror—a war without temporal
or geographic limits—is complete folly, insisting instead that
the fight against terrorist groups should be a law enforcement,
not a military, matter. For decades, Europe has prevented and
punished terrorists by treating them as criminals. Courts in
Britain and Spain have tried suspects for major bombings in
London and Madrid. The prosecutors and investigators there did
so while largely complying with obligations enshrined in human
rights treaties, which constrain them far more than do the
Geneva Conventions.

“The possibility that detainees could remain in
legal limbo indefinitely at Guantánamo has turned
the issue into a foreign-relations disaster for the
United States.”
“The Geneva Conventions turn soldiers into war criminals”
Only if they commit war crimes. For centuries, states have punished
their own soldiers for violations of the laws of war, such as the
mistreatment of prisoners or murder of civilians. The Geneva
Conventions identify certain violations that states must prosecute,
including murder outside of battle, causing civilians great
suffering, and denying POWs fair trials, and most countries have
laws on the books that punish such crimes. The U.S. military,
for example, has investigated hundreds of service members for
abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to dozens of prosecutions.
Canada prosecuted a group of its peacekeepers for the murder of
a young Somali in 1993.
Yet the idea that ordinary soldiers could be prosecuted in a
foreign country for being, in effect, soldiers fighting a war is
ridiculous.Yes, many countries, including the United States,
have laws allowing foreigners to be tried for various abuses of
war committed anywhere.Yet the risk of prosecution abroad,
particularly of U.S. forces, is minuscule. Those foreign laws only
address bona fide war crimes, and it is rarely in the interest of
foreign governments to aggravate relations with the United States
over spurious prosecutions.
The idea that the International Criminal Court could one day
put U.S. commanders on trial is unlikely in the extreme. That
court could theoretically prosecute U.S. personnel for crimes
committed in, say, Afghanistan, but only if the United States failed
to do so first. What’s more, the court is by its charter dedicated

96

LQN SUMMER 2008

to trying large-scale, horrendous atrocities like those in Sudan.
It is virtually inconceivable that this new institution will want to
pick a fight with the United States over a relatively small number
of abuses.

“The Conventions prevent interrogations of terrorists”
False. If you’ve seen a classic war movie such as The Great Escape,
you know that prisoners of war are only obligated to provide
name, rank, date of birth, and military serial number to their
captors. But the Geneva Conventions do not ban interrogators
from asking for more. In fact, the laws were written with the
expectation that states will grill prisoners, and clear rules were
created to manage the process. In interstate war, any form of
coercion is forbidden, specifically threats, insults, or punishments
if prisoners fail to answer; for all other wars, cruel or degrading
treatment and torture are prohibited. But questioning detainees is
perfectly legal; it simply must be done in a manner that respects
human dignity. The conventions thus hardly require rolling out
the red carpet for suspected terrorists. Many interrogation
tactics are clearly allowed, including good cop-bad cop scenarios,
repetitive or rapid questioning, silent periods, and playing to a
detainee’s ego.
The Bush administration has engaged in legal gymnastics
to avoid the conventions’ restrictions, arguing that preventing
the next attack is sufficient rationale for harsh tactics such
as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, painful stress positions,
deafening music, and traumatic humiliation. These severe
methods have been used despite the protests of a growing chorus
of intelligence officials who say that such approaches are actually
counterproductive to extracting quality information. Seasoned
interrogators consistently say that straightforward questioning
is far more successful for getting at the truth. So, by mangling
the conventions, the United States has joined the company of a
host of unsavory regimes that make regular use of torture. It has
abandoned a system that protects U.S. military personnel from
terrible treatment for one in which the rules are made on the fly.
“The Geneva Conventions ban assassinations”
Actually, no. War is all about killing your enemy, and though the
Geneva Conventions place limits on the “unnecessary suffering”
of soldiers, they certainly don’t seek to outlaw war. Assassinating
one’s enemy when hostilities have been declared is not only
permissible; it is expected. But at the core of the conventions is
the “principle of distinction,” which bans all deliberate targeting
of civilians. The boundless scope of the war on terror makes it
difficult to decide who is and is not a civilian. The United States
claims that it can target and kill terrorists at any time, just like
regular soldiers; but the conventions treat these individuals like

quasi-civilians who can be targeted and killed only during “such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities” [emphasis mine]. The
Israeli Supreme Court recently interpreted this phrase to give
Israel limited latitude to continue targeted killings, but it insisted
on a high standard of proof that the target had lost protected
status and that capture was impossible. What standards the United
States might be using—such as when the CIA targeted and killed
several al Qaeda operatives in Yemen in 2002—are highly classified, so there’s no way to know how much proof is insisted upon
before the trigger is pulled or the button pushed.
For European countries and others who reject the idea of a
“war” against terrorists to begin with, targeted killings are especially abhorrent, as international law prohibits states in peacetime
from extrajudicial killings. There are very specific exceptions to
this rule, such as when a police officer must defend himself or
others against imminent harm. To that end, a suicide bomber
heading for a crowd could legally be assassinated as a last resort.
By contrast, suspected terrorists—whether planning a new attack
or on the lam—are to be captured and tried.

“The Conventions require closing Guantánamo”
No, but changes must be made. The Geneva Conventions allow
countries to detain POWs in camps, and, if someone in enemy
hands does not fit the POW category, he or she is automatically
accorded civilian status, which has its own protections. But none
of the residents of Guantánamo’s military prison qualifies as
either, according to the Bush administration, thus depriving the
roughly 275 detainees who remain there of the rights accorded by
the conventions, such as adequate shelter and eventual release.
The possibility that detainees could remain in legal limbo indefinitely at Guantánamo has turned the issue into a foreign-relations
disaster for the United States. But let’s be clear—the Geneva
Conventions don’t require the United States to close up shop in
Cuba. The rules simply insist that a working legal framework be
put in place, instead of the legal vacuum that exists now.
There are several options worth consideration. The prison at
Guantánamo could be turned into a pre-trial holding area where
detainees are held before they are brought before U.S. courts on
formal charges. (The hiccup here is that most of the detainees
haven’t clearly violated any U.S. law.) Alternatively, the U.S.
Congress could pass legislation installing a system of preventive
detention for dangerous individuals. The courts could occasionally review detainees’ particular circumstances and judge whether
continued detention is necessary and lawful. (The problem here
is that such a system would run against 200 years of American
jurisprudence.) In the end, closing Guantánamo is probably the
only option that would realistically restore America’s reputation,
though it isn’t required by any clause in the conventions. It’s just
the wisest course of action.

“No nation flouts the Geneva Conventions more than
the United States”
That’s absurd. When bullets start flying, rules get broken. The
degree to which any army adheres to the Geneva Conventions
is typically a product of its professionalism, training, and sense
of ethics. On this score, U.S. compliance with the conventions
has been admirable, far surpassing many countries and guerrilla
armies that routinely ignore even the most basic provisions. The
U.S. military takes great pride in teaching its soldiers civilized
rules of war: to preserve military honor and discipline, lessen
tensions with civilians, and strive to make a final peace more
durable. Contrast that training with Eritrea or Ethiopia, states
whose ill-trained forces committed numerous war crimes during
their recent border war, or Guatemala, whose army and paramilitaries made a policy of killing civilians on an enormous scale
during its long civil conflict.
More importantly, the U.S. military cares passionately that
other states and nonstate actors follow the same rules to which
it adheres, because U.S. forces, who are deployed abroad in far
greater numbers than troops from any other nation, are most
likely to be harmed if the conventions are discarded. Future
captors of U.S. forces will find new excuses to deny them
treatment under the conventions; and depriving detainees in U.S.
custody of decent treatment could decrease the likelihood that
they will surrender, prolonging armed conflict and U.S. casualties. Career U.S. military commanders and lawyers have consistently opposed the various reinterpretations of the conventions
by politically appointed lawyers in the Bush White House and
Justice Department for precisely this reason.
It is enormously important that the United States reaffirms
its commitment to the conventions, for the sake of the country’s
reputation and that of the conventions. Those who rely on the
flawed logic that because al Qaeda does not treat the conventions
seriously, neither should the United States fail to see not only
the chaos the world will suffer in exchange for these rules; they
also miss the fact that the United States will have traded basic
rights and protections harshly learned through thousands of years
of war for the nitpicking decisions of a small group of partisan
lawyers huddled in secret. Rather than advancing U.S. interests
by following an established standard of behavior in this new
type of war, the United States—and any country that chooses
to abandon these hard-won rules—risks basing its policies on
narrow legalisms. In losing sight of the crucial protections of the
conventions, the United States invites a world of wars in which
laws disappear. And the horrors of such wars would far surpass
anything the war on terror could ever deliver. n
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